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Publicly Funded Objectors 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch*
On paper, class actions run like clockwork. But practice suggests the 
need for tune-ups: sometimes judges still approve settlements rife 
with red flags, and professional objectors may be more concerned 
with shaking down class counsel than with improving class members’ 
outcomes. The lack of data on the number of opt-outs, objectors, and 
claims rates fuels debates on both sides, for little is known about how 
well or poorly class members actually fare. This reveals a ubiquitous 
problem — information barriers confront judges, objectors, and 
even reformers. Rule 23’s answer is to empower objectors. At best, 
objectors are a partial fix. They step in as the adversarial process 
breaks down in an attempt to resurrect the information-generating 
function that culture creates. And, as the proposed changes to Rule 
23’s handling of objectors reflect, turmoil exists over how to encourage 
noble objectors that benefit class members while staving off those 
that namely seek rents from class counsel. The U.S. class-action 
scheme is not the only one that relies on private actors to perform 
public functions: citizens privately fund political campaigns, and 
private lobbyists provide research and information to lawmakers 
about public bills and policies. Across disciplines, the best responses 
to those challenges have often been to level up, not down. This 
Article therefore proposes a leveling up approach to address judges’ 
information deficit such that they can better perform their monitoring 
role. By relying on public funds to subsidize data collection efforts 
and nonprofit objectors’ information-gathering function, we can 
disrupt private class counsel’s disproportionate influence. 
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IntrodUCtIon
The year 2016 marked the fiftieth anniversary of America’s modern-day class 
action, long enough for us to have witnessed its heyday and its gradual erosion. 
Judges have toyed with interpretations of commonality and predominance,1 
and now the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is tinkering with the rule 
once again.2 But the same tired principal-agent problems that have developed 
over the last fifty years have refused to retire. The worry that agents are 
rationally self-interested and will shirk or sell out their principals if not 
properly monitored still persists. 
To address this problem, Rule 23 installs the judge as the monitor. It 
gives judges clear policing power throughout the litigation: judges appoint 
class counsel, certify that counsel and the class representatives fairly and 
adequately represent the members’ interests, ensure that the class settlement 
is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and award class counsel’s fee. And there are 
checks on the judge, too — opt outs, objections, and appeals. In Rule 23(b)
(3) classes, because only class counsel stands to gain attorneys’ fees, a host 
of competing attorneys who are otherwise boxed out of that fee award have 
incentives to solicit and assist class members in opting out.3 Objectors can take 
issue with the settlement’s terms or class counsel’s fee.4 And, if objectors face 
a chilly reception in the district court, then they can appeal. Appellate courts 
stand ready to reverse collusive deals and chastise self-dealing attorneys.5
On paper, things run like clockwork. But practice suggests the need for 
tune-ups: some judges still approve settlements rife with red flags,6 and 
1 Fed. r. civ. p. 23(a); e.g., Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
Now plaintiffs must prove Rule 23’s standards by a preponderance of the evidence 
and district courts must consider the merits before certifying a class — at least 
insofar as the merits overlap with Rule 23’s requirements. Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414 (2014); Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. 
Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194-95 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008).
2 Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Agenda Book (Nov. 3-4, 2016) [hereinafter 
Advisory Committee’s November Agenda Book].
3 Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class 
Action, 103 colum. l. rev. 149, 168-69 (2003).
4 Fed. r. civ. p. 23(e)(5), (h)(2).
5 E.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2014); Eubank v. Pella 
Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014).
6 Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class 
Action Settlements, 92 noTre dame l. rev. 859 (2016).
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professional objectors may be more concerned with shaking down class 
counsel than with improving class members’ outcomes. The lack of data on 
the number of opt-outs, objectors, and claims filing fuels debates on both 
sides, for little is known about how well or poorly class members actually 
fare.7 This reveals a ubiquitous problem — information barriers confront 
judges, objectors, and even reformers. 
7 Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparent Are Class Action 
Outcomes? Empirical Research on the Availability of Class Action Claims Data 
2 (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Working Paper No. WR-599-ICJ, 2008), http://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2008/RAND_WR599.
pdf (“A veil of secrecy can fall over class action litigation the moment the judge 
signs off on the agreement and ultimately, little information is available about 
how many class members actually received compensation and to what degree.”) 
(published later as William B. Rubenstein & Nicholas M. Pace, Shedding Light 
on Outcomes in Class Actions, in conFidenTialiTY, TransparencY, and The u.s. 
civil JusTice sYsTem 20, 22 (Joseph W. Doherty et al. eds., 2012)). Pace and 
Rubenstein summarize their quest for data as follows: 
What we found, quite simply, was virtually nothing: few class action 
participants responded to our request for data, fewer still provided any; the 
official case files themselves were similarly sparse. Our two data collection 
efforts yielded information on fewer that one in five class actions in our 
sample. The information we were able to glean, however, confirmed that the 
distribution of benefits to class members in at least some cases fell far short 
of the ideal, thus underscoring the importance of transparency in this area.
 Id. at 3. In the years that followed, there has been some headway on data collection. 
E.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and 
Their Fee Awards, 7 J. empirical leGal sTud. 811 (2010) (studying settlements 
from 2006 and 2007). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has collected 
information on consumer class actions, and found that the average claims rate was 
twenty-one percent and the median was eight percent. Attorneys’ fees’ overall 
percentage was twenty-one percent of cash relief. consumer Fin. proTecTion 
Bureau, arBiTraTion sTudY 326 (2015). Two studies on employee and consumer 
class actions also exist, but reach conflicting conclusions. Mayer Brown LLP, 
Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members? An Empirical Analysis of Class 
Actions (Executive Summary, 2013), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
uploads/sites/1/Class_Action_Study.pdf (concluding that class actions “provide 
little or no benefit to consumers); naT’l ass’n oF consumer advocaTes & The 
am. ass’n For JusTice, class acTions are a cornersTone oF our civil JusTice 
sYsTem: a review oF class acTions Filed in 2009 (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.
consumeradvocates.org/sites/default/files/Class%20Action%20Report%20
2-27-15.pdf (concluding that class actions “often provided enormous benefits to 
consumers”). There is likewise relatively little recent empirical data on objectors. 
The latest study that I know of is Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The 
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Accordingly, Part I begins by identifying the information deficit. Part II 
addresses Rule 23’s remedy for this problem: objectors. It shows that at best, 
objectors are a partial fix. They step in as the adversarial process breaks down 
in an attempt to resurrect the information-generating function that culture 
creates. And, as the proposed changes to Rule 23’s handling of objectors 
reflect, turmoil exists over how to encourage noble objectors that benefit class 
members while staving off those that namely seek rents from class counsel. 
Yet, this concern about screening the bad from the good has distracted us 
from both the bigger question and the true challenge. The bigger question is 
how we ensure that judges have the necessary information (and incentive) to 
monitor the attorneys and ensure that the settlement is fair when the adversarial 
system breaks down. And the real challenge is how we confront the intense 
regulatory struggle that arises anytime private actors perform public functions. 
Addressing the public-private challenge can generate possibilities for 
overcoming information deficits. Our class-action scheme is not the only one 
that relies on private actors to perform public functions — citizens privately 
fund political campaigns, and private lobbyists provide research and information 
to lawmakers about public bills and policies. Across disciplines, the best 
responses to those challenges have often been to level up, not down. Part 
III therefore proposes a leveling up approach to address judges’ information 
deficit such that they can better perform their monitoring role. By relying 
on public funds to subsidize data collection and nonprofit objectors, we can 
disrupt the disproportionate influence that the settling parties have over the 
information judges receive about class settlements. 
I. the InforMAtIon defICIt
Some change is already on the horizon. Since 2011, the Rule 23 Subcommittee 
of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has been looking under Rule 23’s 
proverbial hood to see what kind of tune-ups it might need. Abandoning an 
initially ambitious agenda that included a new Rule 23(b)(4) for settlement class 
actions,8 the Subcommittee’s latest changes are far more modest in scope. Of 
note, however, are its proposals on “frontloading,” and “bad faith” objectors.
Frontloading is shorthand for increasing the information available to judges 
before certifying the class. The proposal is housed within Rule 23(e), which 
Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and 
Empirical Issues, 57 vand. l. rev. 1529 (2004).
8 Compare Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Agenda Book (Apr. 9-10, 2015), 
with Advisory Committee’s November Agenda Book, supra note 2.
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governs judicial approval of class settlements. The basics are still the same — 
settlements must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate” — but now, when making 
that call, judges must explicitly consider whether “the class representatives 
and class counsel have adequately represented the class;” “the proposal was 
negotiated at arm’s length;” “the relief provided for the class is adequate;” 
and “class members are treated equitably relative to each other.”9 In deciding 
whether the relief is adequate, judges must consider additional factors such 
as “the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;” “the effectiveness of the 
proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of 
processing class-member claims, if required;” “the terms of any proposed 
award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment;” and “any agreement 
required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3),” which governs objectors.10 
These inquiries reinforce the 1966 Rule 23 drafters’ design choice: judges 
protect against attorney overreaching. 
Protecting against attorney overreaching entails identifying when it occurs. 
Ordinarily, judges can count on the adversarial system to bring scurrilous 
behavior to light. Not so in class settlements. Formerly feuding parties are now 
both friends of the deal, united in seeking a judicial blessing. How then should 
judges answer these questions? The draft committee note suggests considering 
a few proxies such as: “the nature and amount of discovery in this or other 
cases, or the actual outcomes of other cases,” which “may indicate whether 
counsel negotiating on behalf of the class had an adequate information base;” 
“other litigation about the same general subject on behalf of class members;” 
whether the parties used a “court affiliated mediator or facilitator” in settling 
the claims; and whether the claims-processing procedures are fair.11 Judges 
might also consider opt-out rates and “take” rates, which reflect how many 
class members have filed claims, as a signaling device.12
Most of these inquiries beg the same question — as compared to what? 
Looking internally at the proceeding may tell judges little, particularly if the 
parties are the primary information sources. When parties consider the nature 
and amount of discovery in their present case or their other cases, the natural 
9 Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Agenda Book 253 (June 6-7, 
2016) [hereinafter Advisory Committee’s June Agenda Book]. These proposals 
have grown out of the principles oF The law oF aGGreGaTe liTiGaTion § 3.05 (am. 
law insT. 2010). It is far easier for class objectors to spot deals that exaggerate 
settlement value or provide a windfall to class counsel, than it is to identify 
settlements that let the defendant off too cheaply.
10 Advisory Committee’s June Agenda Book, supra note 9, at 253.
11 Id. at 257-58.
12 Id. at 256.
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tendency is to inflate their accomplishments.13 Reporting the outcomes of 
counsel’s other cases is likely to yield information about a fund’s “sticker” 
price, not information about the actual value conferred on class members. As 
claims administrators fight for business and cozy up to repeat players,14 they 
may well capitulate to parties’ requests to implement onerous claims-filing 
procedures such that little compensation finds its way to class members. But 
none of that may be apparent from the face of the filing procedures. It might 
come to light only if judges review the numbers on the back end. Here, the 
advisory committee note’s suggestion becomes particularly salient: settlement 
“[p]rovisions for reporting back to the court about actual claims experience, 
and deferring a portion of the fee award until the claims experience is known, 
may bear on the fairness of the overall proposed settlement.”15 Yet, judges are 
eager to close cases, not to oversee settlement administration.
Looking externally, either at other cases in general or at those over which 
the same judge presided, may likewise yield little helpful information. If the 
same judge handled class actions in the past without monitoring them carefully, 
then that reference point simply gives them license to use the same low bar. 
And, without any systematic data collection efforts to supply judges with hard 
facts,16 looking at other cases will simply be an exercise in anecdote where 
parties marshal favorable cases to support the deal they’ve struck. 
II. enter objeCtorS
How then can we solve the information gap such that judges can appropriately 
police self-interested behavior? After all, the temptation toward self-interest 
and structural collusion is well documented: because defendants care little 
about how the money is divvied up among class counsel and class members, 
class counsel may trade less relief for class members in exchange for higher 
attorneys’ fees for themselves.17 Moreover, as Sam Issacharoff has explained: 
13 Plus, in an age of electronic filing where document review can be easily outsourced 
to legal service providers abroad, reviewing millions of pages of documents may 
drum up billable hours, but it is hardly a good measure of a settlement’s worth.
14 Claims administrators like Providio already seem to pay to send the “masters 
of mass tort” and the federal judges who handle them to the Ritz Carlton in 
Cancun for continuing legal education. masTers oF mass TorT, http://www.
mastersofmasstort.com (last visited June 28, 2017). 
15 Advisory Committee’s June Agenda Book, supra note 9, at 259.
16 The CFPB report provides one data source in consumer protection class actions. 
consumer Fin. proTecTion Bureau, supra note 7, at 326.
17 E.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting 
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“No matter how virtuous the judge, the fact remains that courts are overworked, 
they have limited access to quality information, and they have an overwhelming 
incentive to clear their docket. They cannot reliably police the day-to-day 
interests of absent class members.”18
Enter class-action objectors.19 Rule 23 relies principally on those dissatisfied 
with the fee or the settlement’s terms to help judges see past the mirage of 
settlement. Objectors can bring to light new information about structural 
conflicts of interest within the class or between class members and class 
counsel, as well as information about unfair outcomes.20 Of course, objectors 
are critical to other facets of due process, too, such as the right to participate 
and the opportunity to be heard.
The trouble, however, is that this system has given rise to a cottage industry 
of either “good” (read nonprofit public interest organizations) or “bad faith” 
objectors (often for-profit attorneys), who lodge objections cobbled together 
from past ones with little informational value for judges.21 Granted, the lines 
between good and bad and even between for-profit and nonprofit are not always 
the “dangers of collusion between class counsel and the defendant”); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic 
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 
86 colum. l. rev. 669, 715-16 (1986) (discussing collusion in class settlements); 
Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class 
Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 n.Y.u. l. rev. 439 (1996) (documenting 
the ways in which class-action rules fail to protect class members’ interests 
when they conflict with one another).
18 Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 u.c. davis l. rev. 805, 828 
(1997); see also Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders 
or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. chi. leGal F. 403, 405-06 (noting that trial 
judges must vigorously scrutinize proposed settlements, but lack the “incentive, 
information, and practical ability to effectively monitor class counsel”).
19 Numerous courts have praised class objectors’ work in identifying collusive 
deals. E.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282-83 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
20 principles oF The law oF aGGreGaTe liTiGaTion § 2.07(a) (am. law insT. 2010); 
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 
156 u. pa. l. rev. 1649, 1677-97 (2008); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and 
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 sup. cT. rev. 337, 385.
21 Brunet, supra note 18, at 472:
These public sector objectors march to the beat of a different drummer 
in their motivation and they bring to the case specialist attorneys better 
able to monitor the performance of the attorneys who have negotiated a 
class action settlement. The normal agency cost criticisms of class action 
objections seem less severe for these public sector objectors.
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clear.22 Still, so-called “bad” objectors seem to care less about improving 
the deal and more about extracting payment from the class attorneys by 
threatening to hold up the deal (and class counsel’s attorneys’ fees) through 
appeals.23 Critics often focus on unpopular for-profit objectors who may have 
similar pending lawsuits and are thus unhappy about losing the attorneys’ fees 
that class counsel receives as well as those who are otherwise strategically 
motivated.24 Of course, one might level the same accusations at class counsel, 
for the private attorney general model has no “pure heart” requirement.25 
It incentivizes private lawyers to investigate and sue namely because it is 
profitable to do so.26 
Nevertheless, much of the Subcommittee’s current report addresses the 
best way of sorting the bad from the good — even though all objectors are 
22 E.g., id. at 438 (noting that Brian Wolfman, then of Public Citizen, “claims to know 
only one professional objector, and notes that this attorney has made meritorious 
objections in many cases”); Alison Frankel, Exposing Class Action Objectors: 
Lieff Cabraser, Ted Frank in ‘Lurid’ Dispute, reuTers (June 22, 2015), http://
blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/06/22/exposing-class-action-objectors-lieff-
cabraser-ted-frank-in-lurid-dispute/; Alison Frankel, The Ted Frank Interview: 
‘I Was Doing It for the Greater Good,’ reuTers (June 25, 2015), http://blogs.
reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/06/25/the-ted-frank-interview-i-was-doing-it-
for-the-greater-good/. 
23 As the Subcommittee notes, 
some objectors may be seeking only personal gain, and using objections to 
gain benefits for themselves rather than assisting in the settlement-review 
process. At least in some instances, it seems that objectors — or their 
counsel — have sought to extract tribute to withdraw their objections or 
dismiss appeals from judgments approving class settlements. 
 Advisory Committee’s June Agenda Book, supra note 9, at 259. But see Brunet, 
supra note 18, at 471-72 (“Recent developments cast objectors in a more positive 
light. Both the proposed amendments to Rule 23 and recent case law value the 
input of class action objectors and seemingly ignore the free-riding extortionist 
story.”).
24 E.g., Lawrence W. Schonbrun, The Class Action Con Game, reGulaTion, Fall 
1997, at 50 (“[O]bjectors are as welcome in the courtroom as is the guest at a 
wedding ceremony who responds affirmatively to the minister’s question, ‘Is 
there anyone here who opposes this marriage?’”).
25 For a helpful typology of private attorneys general and where class actions fall 
on this spectrum, see William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney 
General” Is — And Why It Matters, 57 vand. l. rev. 2129, 2156 (2004).
26 See Issacharoff, supra note 18, at 830 (“If the price of private policing of 
misconduct is a need for plaintiffs’ attorneys, and if the further consequence is 
that the good ones get rich, so be it.”).
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“the proverbial skunk at the garden party” from the parties’ perspective.27 The 
report aims to curb bad objectors by requiring all objectors to specify their 
grounds for objecting, and by banning payment (or other consideration) to 
objectors unless the district court approves — a requirement that remains in 
place until the circuit clerk dockets the objector’s appeal.28 
Unfortunately, however, this change does little to improve the central 
concern about information asymmetries. Turning off the payment spigot may 
stop payoffs, but it relies on the judge to distinguish between good and bad 
objectors using information that’s typically gathered from the very parties 
that objectors are supposed to help judges monitor. Dealing with objectors 
thus turns into a vicious cycle. Judges must depend on friends of the deal 
(class counsel and the defendant) to monitor the objectors who are supposed 
to be monitoring them. 
This creates a conundrum under the proposed changes: on one hand, judges 
would be tasked with making more specific findings under Rule 23(e) as to 
the adequacy of the settlement and the representation, but, on the other, they 
would have the same elementary tools that they’ve had for the past fifty years. 
Not only do these tools rely on the parties themselves (the assumed culprits) 
to ferret the good police from the bad, but they fail to properly incentivize 
objectors to identify the worst settlements. Currently, objectors who successfully 
derail a class settlement receive no fees whatsoever.29 Incentive-wise, this 
encourages for-profit objectors to seek settlements that they can adjust at 
the margins, not highly problematic deals that would need to be scrapped.30 
27 Alan B. Morrison, Improving the Class Action Settlement Process: Little Things 
Mean a Lot, 79 Geo. wash. l. rev. 428, 428 (2011); see also Brunet, supra 
note 18, at 411 (“I have spoken with counsel who described objectors as ‘warts 
on the class action process,’ and I also found references to objectors as ‘pond 
scum’ and ‘bottom feeders.’”).
28 Advisory Committee’s November Agenda Book, supra note 2, at 32.
29 principles oF The law oF aGGreGaTe liTiGaTion § 3.08 cmt. a (am. law insT. 
2010) (“Because of this gap, counsel for legitimate objectors have little incentive 
to object when the result of a successful objection would be to invalidate the 
entire settlement.”); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be 
Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 hoFsTra l. rev. 129, 145 (2001); William 
B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 
53 ucla l. rev. 1435, 1448-51 (2006); e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 1995 WL 222177 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 1995) (rejecting the 
proposed class settlement on the basis of Public Citizen’s objections but awarding 
no fee to the objector).
30 Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 1450.
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Working within the current system’s reliance on objectors as informants 
suggests two, non-mutually exclusive possibilities for reform. First, we might 
raise the stakes for for-profit objectors by harnessing the rivalries within the 
plaintiffs’ bar. For example, Richard Nagareda has suggested presumptively 
removing class counsel when an objector demonstrates that the proposed 
class settlement is unfair, and presumptively replacing the class attorneys 
with the competing law firm that demonstrated the inadequacy.31 Higher 
stakes make it more attractive for professional objectors to invest resources 
in uncovering inadequate representation and could even attract a different 
caliber of for-profit objectors.32 This likewise eliminates the bar to attorneys’ 
fees for objectors who successfully trash a proposed settlement.33 Incentive-
wise, presumptively replacing class counsel with the successful objector 
encourages for-profit objectors to pursue highly problematic settlements 
that they could take over.34 The trouble, however, is that judges are already 
reluctant to overturn problematic settlements for fear that doing so will hold 
up the settlement. Replacing class counsel would cause far more delay, and 
may actually prompt judges to resolve close questions in class counsel’s 
favor so as to avoid having to engage with the question of replacing counsel.35
Second, we might look for ways to encourage more nonprofit objectors to 
enter the arena. Because profit is not their motive, public interest organizations 
31 Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 
82 Tex. l. rev. 287, 347-63 (2003); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing 
Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 hoFsTra l. rev. 633 (2003) (suggesting 
that objectors should be able to bid for the right to serve as class counsel). For 
additional proposals, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 
62 vand. l. rev. 1623 (2009) (suggesting an inalienability rule that would 
prohibit objectors from settling appeals unless they prompted class attorneys to 
modify the settlement); and John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action 
Professional Objectors: What to Do About Them?, 39 Fla. sT. u. l. rev. 865 
(2012) (arguing for increased appellate bonds).
32 Some courts have, for example, awarded incentive payments to class members 
who conferred a benefit on the class through their objection. E.g., Dewey v. 
Volkswagen of Am., 909 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D.N.J. 2012) (awarding a nominal 
incentive payment to objectors).
33 principles oF The law oF aGGreGaTe liTiGaTion § 3.08 cmt. a; Koniak & Cohen, 
supra note 29, at 145; Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 1448-51. 
34 Nagareda, supra note 31.
35 Judges have the authority to replace class counsel but rarely do so. E.g., White 
v. Experian Info. Sol., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (denying a motion 
to disqualify class counsel). Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2014) 
is one such rare example.
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are more likely to challenge the most egregious settlements and, as repeat 
players, they develop the expertise to spot problematic settlement provisions 
and attorneys’ fees.36 A few public interest groups have undertaken this role,37 
but most nonprofit organizations focus on class actions only occasionally.38 
Nonprofits face two constraints: a need to fulfill ideological commitments to 
remain faithful to their mission (and encourage donors), and limited resources.39 
A steady source of public funds, however, might not only solve the resource 
deficit, but could encourage such groups to proliferate. This would create 
what Heather Gerken labels “second-order diversity,” where ideologies and 
goals differ across, but not within, those organizations.40 Consequently, even 
if a single nonprofit objector focused only on a subset of class-action issues, 
if enough nonprofits thrived, then collectively they might police the gamut 
of class-action abuses. 
III. A levelIng Up propoSAl for nonprofIt objeCtorS 
Class actions in the United States privatize a public function: law enforcement. 
Paying private lawyers attorneys’ fees based on the benefits they confer on 
class members incentivizes lawyers to act as private attorneys general.41 After 
fifty years, Americans feel at home with private class actions. Still, this is a 
distinctly American choice. And this choice deviates from a world norm: most 
countries allow public officials to sue on their citizens’ behalf — not private 
actors.42 Other countries, such as Brazil and Chile, allow for consumer class 
actions, but only when initiated by a governmental agency or a consumer 
association.43 Still others, like Taiwan, use public interest associations as 
vehicles to drive class actions.44
36 Brunet, supra note 18, at 448-49, 462, 472.
37 Several come readily to mind such as Public Citizen, and the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute’s Center for Class Action Fairness. Other public institutes 
initiate class actions such as Public Justice and the Impact Fund.
38 Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 1451.
39 Brunet, supra note 18, at 409-10; Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 1450.
40 Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 harv. l. rev. 1101, 1172-73 
(2005). 
41 Rubenstein, supra note 25, at 2156.
42 Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622 
annals am. acad. pol. & soc. sci. 7, 13 (2009).
43 Deborah R. Hensler, The Global Landscape of Collective Litigation, in class 
acTions in conTexT 3, 13-15 (Deborah R. Hensler et al. eds., 2016).
44 Kuo-Chang Huang, Using Associations as a Vehicle for Class Actions: The Case 
of Taiwan, in class acTions in conTexT, supra note 43, at 70, 90; Robin Hui 
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This public-private divide plays out in other aspects of American government 
as well, such as lobbying. Just as class counsel provides judges with information 
about class settlements and attorneys’ fees, lobbyists provide lawmakers with 
information about bills, electoral implications of supporting a particular bill, 
and the likely consequences of enacting policies.45 Put simply, lobbyists and 
class counsel both trade in information. And the information they supply 
may distort the political or judicial process in ways that are both troubling 
and opaque. Moreover, the target audience — judges and legislators — are 
generalists; many issues compete for their limited time.46 Accordingly, to 
further their own ends, both lobbyists and class counsel provide prepackaged 
information that they hope will ease their proposal’s path toward enactment 
or certification. As Heather Gerken and Alex Tausanovitch point out, when 
politicians experience substantial demands on their time, “they will have 
every incentive to take what you might think of as the ‘fast food’ option 
provided by lobbyists.”47 Judges, like politicians, have every incentive to like 
the “Happy Meals” class settlement supply. Settlements clear dockets. And, 
for once, all the parties agree.
Both lobbyists and class counsel trade, in part, on information that a 
politician or a judge could find on her own. Legislative staffers could easily 
drum up nonpolitical publicly available information just as a judicial clerk 
could unearth information about “the nature and amount of discovery” and 
“the actual outcomes of other cases,” as the proposed amendments to Rule 23 
suggest.48 But judicial clerks, like staffers, have limited time and bandwidth. 
Why not rely on someone else to do it for them? Plus, the more complex the 
bill or the case, the more they will need to rely on experts — lobbyists and 
class counsel. In class actions, even if the judicial clerk has inside access to 
information about cases that her judge has handled in the past, that information 
will be limited. Repeat players, on the other hand, specialize not only in 
litigating class actions, but in litigating particular kinds of class actions — 
Huang, Rethinking the Relationship Between Public Regulation and Private 
Litigation: Evidence from Securities Class Action in China, 19 TheoreTical 
inquiries l. 333 (2018).
45 anThonY J. nowens, ToTal loBBYinG: whaT loBBYisTs wanT (and how TheY 
TrY To GeT iT) 29-30 (1998); Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch, A 
Public Finance Model for Lobbying: Lobbying, Campaign Finance, and the 
Privatization of Democracy, 13 elecTion l.J. 75, 80 (2014).
46 See Gerken & Tausanovitch, supra note 45, at 80.
47 Id.
48 Advisory Committee’s June Agenda Book, supra note 9, at 257-58; Gerken & 
Tausanovitch, supra note 45, at 81.
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employment, antitrust, securities, etc. — and may have intimate knowledge 
about hundreds of previous cases.
Lobbyists, class counsel, and even objectors are all private actors performing 
a public role. In this way, the United States stands out from all its counterparts 
who tend to have not only government enforcement, but also public sources 
of expertise like government-funded think tanks.49 Regulating class action and 
lobbying practices is tricky because private actors are “shape shifters,” not fixed 
legal entities.50 Repeat actors in both realms are sophisticated, entrepreneurial 
agents who evolve to capitalize on changing circumstances, act strategically 
in ways that are sometimes rational and sometimes not, are connected and 
interdependent, and generate adaptive outcomes that cannot be isolated into their 
component parts.51 Consequently, enacting meaningful reform and enhancing 
functionality is difficult. The question becomes how to implement adjustments 
that can evolve with the times and provide the key component that the private 
system needs to function properly: relevant, transparent information.
Drawing parallels with campaign finance reforms, Gerken and Tausanovitch 
argue that the solution to lobbying is not to inhibit private lobbyists, but to 
level up: publicly fund policy research consultants — public lobbyists.52 
Campaign finance and lobbying suffer from some of the same ills that plague 
class actions. When private actors fund campaigns and when legislators 
depend on private lobbyists for critical information on bills, we worry about 
the influence private money may have, aim to prevent bribery, and yearn for 
transparency and disclosure. Just as it’s difficult to differentiate between good 
and bad class-action objectors, in lobbying and campaign finance it’s hard to 
distinguish between actors who fulfill public needs as opposed to those who 
aim solely to advance their own interests (or exercise their First Amendment 
rights).53 As such, Gerken and Tausanovitch argue that the lobbying solution 
49 Gerken & Tausanovitch, supra note 45, at 78 (“In the United States, much of 
the funding for legislative information is private. In Europe and elsewhere, the 
funding is far more likely to be public.”); Hensler, supra note 42, at 13.
50 Gerken & Tausanovitch, supra note 45, at 77.
51 See John h. miller & scoTT e. paGe, complex adapTive sYsTems: an inTroducTion 
To compuTaTional models oF social liFe 221 (2007); scoTT e. paGe, diversiTY 
and complexiTY 7-8, 38 (2010); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. 
Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 
cornell l. rev. 1445 (2017); Gerken & Tausanovitch, supra note 45, at 82; J.B. 
Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 Ga. sT. u. l. rev. 885, 889 (2008).
52 Gerken & Tausanovitch, supra note 45, at 88.
53 Id. at 85-86 (noting that in the campaign-finance context, “[o]nce we lose the 
means to distinguish the little guy from the big guy, we’re stuck in the same 
place we’re stuck in for lobbying”).
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is the same as that in campaign finance: don’t clamp down on private activity, 
“beef up” public competitors.54 Use matching funds or grants to publicly finance 
groups that do not enjoy corporate funding or create “research consultants” 
who might form something akin to a public-interest law firm.55
Leveling up could provide the right balance for class-action objectors, 
too.56 Currently, however, the Subcommittee’s proposal aims to clamp down 
on parasitic objectors, but does little to improve the informational content of 
class counsel’s “Happy Meals.” Leveling up by publicly subsidizing nonprofit 
objectors may be a complementary solution.57 
A. Funding Sources 
Recognizing a need to level up to address the information deficit that judges 
face and filling that need by subsidizing nonprofit objectors with public funds 
still leaves us with a big question — where might we find the money? Although 
public funding in a system that has steadfastly depended on financing from 
private lawyers (and even third-party financiers) may seem peculiar, the 
United States need not write on an entirely blank slate. Using public funding 
to supplement private efforts has been a staple of class-action regimes in both 
Canada and Israel, and each offers lessons about how public subsidies might 
work within the United States. 
Israel funds collective actions, in part, through its general tax base. Its public 
funding is thus subject to the same budgetary constraints as all government 
54 Id. at 85-87.
55 Dorie Apollonio et al., Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption 
Problem, 36 hasTinGs consT. l.q. 13, 46-47 (2008) (proposing a “public 
defender model, with publicly-funded lobbyists for groups that can demonstrate a 
sufficiently broad membership base and non-corporate funding,” and noting that 
“[t]he funding could be matching or complete subsidy”); Gerken & Tausanovitch, 
supra note 45, at 88-89. 
56 Just as funding political candidates allows citizens to exercise free speech rights, 
objecting to class settlements allows class members to exercise their due process 
rights to be heard.
57 Subsidizing nonprofit objectors is, of course, but one way to level up. Creating 
a new “designated objector” position at the Federal Judicial Center, or a type of 
class-specific ombudsperson would be other options. But like any governmental 
agent who repeatedly interacts with the same regulated entities, concerns about 
the potential for capture arise. Public interest organizations, on the other hand, 
attract donors based on results and genuine change. Plus, there are multiple 
organizations with interest and expertise spanning the wide range of subject 
matters that class actions encompass.
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projects.58 In 2006, Israel’s new class-action law permitted individuals, nonprofit 
organizations, and public regulators to initiate class actions and created a 
public fund to aid individuals in financing cases that the government deems 
socially and publicly valuable.59 Even though individual class members have 
brought over ninety-nine percent of class actions in the past six years, they 
rarely receive government funding — the fund’s $260,000 budget is too small 
to be of much use.60 While the Ministry of Justice’s fund has fallen prey to 
budget restrictions, the separate Israeli Securities Authority (ISA) has had 
slightly more success in subsidizing securities class actions.61 The success 
here, however, is not attributable to the money, which is likewise hampered 
by limited resources, but by the signal that the ISA sends when it agrees 
to help finance a case.62 Funding a case suggests that it is meritorious and 
socially valuable.63
Israel also permits objections from its attorney general and nonprofit 
organizations.64 Although Israeli nonprofits suffer from the same setbacks 
that United States nonprofits do (many lack expertise and resources), Israel 
has taken steps to encourage legitimate objectors. In 2016, Israel amended 
its class-action law to allow any “person who acts in the interest of class 
58 Camille Cameron, Jasminka Kalajdzic & Alon Klement, Economic Enablers, 
in class acTions in conTexT, supra note 43, at 137, 150.
59 Id. at 166. A historical overview of Israel’s experience with class actions can be 
found in Amichai Magen & Peretz Segal, Israel, 622 annals am. acad. pol. 
& soc. sci. 244, 244-48 (2009).
60 Cameron, Kalajdzic & Klement, supra note 58, at 166.
61 Id.
62 The ISA received only eight applications between 2008 and 2009 and funded 
only one of them. Id. 
63 Id. 
64 The Israeli Attorney General appears far more effective than attorneys general 
in the United States. Although the Class Action Fairness Act requires the settling 
parties to notify the appropriate government official, those officials rarely get 
involved. 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2005). In contrast, the Israeli Attorney General has 
submitted briefs in seventy percent of the proposed class settlements, fifteen 
percent of which include objections. When it objects, courts listen: courts 
approved only twenty-five percent of the objectionable settlements without 
changes. Alon Klement & Robert Klonoff, Class Actions in the United States 
and Israel: A Comparative Approach, 19 TheoreTical inquiries L. 151, 183-84 
(2018). For a discussion on Israeli objectors, see Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Yair 
Sagy, Courts as Organizations: The Drive for Efficiency and the Regulation of 
Class Action Settlements, 4 sTan. J. complex liTiG. 1 (2016).
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members” to object — no fishing for a class member is required for standing.65 
Likewise, the amendment enabled nonprofits to intervene in class actions 
even in their early stages.66 One common refrain from nonprofit objectors 
in the United States is that a similar standing exception would help remove 
barriers to their involvement.
Like Israel, the United States might subsidize nonprofit objectors from 
its general tax revenue. Policy-wise, this is the first-best solution, for both 
private plaintiffs’ attorneys and objectors who improve class settlements 
are performing an essential public function. We are, after all, each better off 
for not having our cars burst into flames upon impact or turn off while we 
drive them on the interstate. We can lead better lives when our prescription 
medicines adequately warn us of risky side effects, when employers prohibit 
workplace discrimination and harassment, and when medical devices don’t 
fail inside of us. Class actions help police all of these ills. Private attorneys 
perform public services for profit. Using the general tax base to publicly 
subsidize the nonprofit objectors who monitor litigation activities that benefit 
all of us makes sense. 
But, like Israel, the United States faces resource constraints. And Congress 
has sent mixed messages about class actions in the past. In 1996, Congress 
prohibited publicly funded Legal Aid from engaging in class actions, which 
suggested that receiving money from the general tax base may be a nonstarter.67 
In 2005, however, Congress required parties to submit class settlements and a 
host of accompanying information to the appropriate state or federal official.68 
The officials need not respond, but can object or react if the settlement appears 
unfair.69 As one might imagine, however, adding non-mandatory tasks to busy 
officials’ already overburdened workload often accomplishes little — unless 
the attorney general is politically motivated.70 It is possible, however, that 
legislators might be receptive to supporting nonprofit objectors since those 
organizations fall on both sides of the political spectrum. Republicans may 
view the exercise as an extension of tort-reform goals such as shutting down 
65 Klement & Klonoff, supra note 64, at 181, 184 (citing Draft Bill Amending the 
CAL Settlements and Voluntary Dismissals Procedure, 5777-2016, HH (Knesset) 
No. 637, p. 116, https://www.nevo.co.il/law_word/Law16/knesset-637.pdf (Isr.)).
66 Id. (citing Bill Amending the CAL Settlements and Voluntary Dismissals Procedure 
§ 15). 
67 45 U.S.C. § 1617 (2012).
68 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2012).
69 s. rep. no. 109-14, at 32 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 32.
70 See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision: Optimal 
Regulatory Policy?, 156 u. pa. l. rev. 1971, 1982-88 (2008) (detailing attorney 
general involvement in class actions).
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frivolous claims, whereas democrats may perceive the issue as one of holding 
companies accountable for the full effects of their conduct and ensuring that 
class members are appropriately compensated for their injuries. Still, revenue 
from the general tax base is not the only option. Self-funding models offer 
second-best solutions, for they tax those who use the system but not everyone 
who benefits from it. Yet, self-funding may gain more political traction because 
it doesn’t further deplete the general revenue. 
Canada offers two such models, one in Ontario and one in Quebec. By 
taxing successful class-action cases, the availability of public funding in both 
Ontario and Quebec has grown exponentially.71 In particular, these funds 
help ease the financial burden on private litigants in a loser-pays system by 
absorbing those costs in the face of a loss.72 Often recognized as more successful 
than its lesser-used counterpart in Ontario, Quebec’s the Fonds has funded 
roughly one-third of all class actions in that province.73 Although it receives 
limited revenue from government subsidies, most of its funding comes in 
the form of reimbursements from successful recipients, percentages of the 
recoveries it finances, and interest from investments.74 Its government-appointed 
administrative board acts as a gatekeeper. The board screens applications 
based on financial need and proposed claims, decides which applications to 
fund, and provides out-of-pocket litigation costs (for experts, for instance) 
as well as a low billable-hour attorneys’ fee.75 
Several features of the Fonds stand out: it oversees class actions and 
challenges class settlements, it does not charge interest to its recipients, it 
retains a percentage of all class-action proceeds (not just those that it finances), 
it can recover up to ninety percent of the funds remaining after class members 
have collected their payouts, and its mission is “to promote recovery and 
71 Cameron, Kalajdzic & Klement, supra note 58, at 150 (“Ontario’s fund was 
created in 1993, at the same time that class proceedings legislation was enacted, 
with seed money of $500,000. Since then, it has grown exponentially, with no 
additional government funding, to a balance of over $19 million at the end of 
2014.”).
72 Hensler, supra note 42, at 24; Catherine Piché, Public Financiers as Overseers 
of Class Proceedings, 12 n.Y.u. J.l. & Bus. 779, 783-84 (2016). Canada allows 
contingent fees that permit class counsel to receive twenty to forty percent of 
the recovery. Jasminka Kalajdzic et al., Canada, 622 annals am. acad. pol. 
& soc. sci. 41, 44 (2009).
73 Piché, supra note 72, at 796-98.
74 Id.; see also Kalajdzic et al., supra note 72.
75 Piché, supra note 72, at 803.
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provide access to justice.”76 In theory, the Fonds also educates the public 
about the class action’s function and collects data on class outcomes, though 
the educational mission has largely fallen by the wayside and the aggregated 
statistics are sparse.77 
Still, this suggests an additional source of information — the United 
States could level up not only by subsidizing nonprofit objectors, but also 
by aggregating data that the Subcommittee on Rule 23 identified as critical 
for comparison purposes. Turning that into a reality, however, means that a 
successful U.S. statute must not only identify a source of self-funding, but also 
mandate judicial reporting requirements for class-action data and designate 
an entity to aggregate that data. 
Funding-wise, again, seeking general revenue is the first-best solution. But 
assuming that is a nonstarter, Congress might consider imposing a very small 
tax on all class recoveries or a more substantial tax on cy pres remedies, either 
of which would create a sizeable, self-financing fund.78 To be sure, there are 
issues with both.79 For instance, taxing the gross recovery before attorneys’ 
fees are subtracted would tax those that we entrust with public enforcement 
and may dissuade attorneys from pursuing cases at the margin. On the other 
hand, taxing only class members’ recoveries seems to penalize the victims of 
wrongdoing to police those who are supposed to represent them. Consequently, 
taxing cy pres recoveries might be the better of the second-best solutions. 
Public funding would support two activities. First, it would finance a 
public office or a position (perhaps within the Federal Judicial Center) that 
would collect class-action data. Second, it would subsidize grants to nonprofit 
objectors. The public office would act as a clearinghouse for the grants — 
accepting applications and making awards. 
Creating a workable system for data collection is no easy task. Conversations 
with claims administrators suggest that hundreds of data points are available 
and that numbers might easily be skewed through methodology. Housing this 
position within the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center, however, could 
76 Id. at 798-800, 803, 807. As Piché explains, the statute allows the Fonds to 
collect fifty to ninety percent of the funds remaining after class members collect 
their proceeds, thirty to seventy percent of the total award (minus costs and 
attorney’s fees) if the court prohibits individual claims, and two to ten percent 
of individual awards if no aggregate award exists. Id.
77 Id. at 803-06. 
78 As I explore in Section III.B below, taxing cy pres recoveries may strike the 
better balance of incentives.
79 I discuss some of the issues with cy pres funding infra notes 86-88 and 
accompanying text. 
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draw on its researchers’ substantial expertise to develop uniform reporting 
requirements. 
As for the types of data, several nonpartisan entities have pinpointed 
critical data needs. First, the Subcommittee on Rule 23 has identified several 
criteria as points of comparison for judges scrutinizing class settlements: “the 
actual outcomes of other cases,” “other litigation about the same general 
subject on behalf of class members,” the claims-processing procedures, opt-
out rates, and “take” rates, which consider how many class members have 
filed claims.80 Second, the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law 
of Aggregate Litigation propose that when awarding attorneys’ fees, judges 
should “require the parties to submit . . . a final accounting describing the 
amount and distribution of all benefits to class members, other beneficiaries, 
and counsel.”81 Third, the Federal Trade Commission is studying both the 
effectiveness of class notice and the factors that influence consumers’ decisions 
to object, opt out, or participate in a class settlement.82 As part of that study, 
the agency has ordered eight claims administrators to provide information 
about notice methods and response rates, which could serve both as a current 
information source for judges and a resource for data collection methods.
Just as resources already exist to guide information collection, models 
as to how a public fund might subsidize nonprofit objectors are also readily 
available. The Legal Services Corporation (popularly known as Legal Aid) 
provides a ready template. It fields applications for grants that support access 
to justice through legal services, and has developed a toolkit for defining, 
collecting, and reporting on metrics that describe its recipients’ effectiveness.83 
Accordingly, the mechanics of objecting to a class action need not be altered; 
the grants simply encourage nonprofits to proliferate and devote resources 
to policing class actions. 
B. Band-Aid Solutions
This leveling up approach to evening out information asymmetries by publicly 
funding nonprofit objectors and data collection is subject to one primary point 
80 Advisory Committee’s June Agenda Book, supra note 9, at 257-58.
81 principles oF The law oF aGGreGaTe liTiGaTion § 3.13(e) (am. law insT. 2010).
82 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks to Study Class Action Settlements 
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/11/ftc-
seeks-study-class-action-settlements.
83 leGal serv. corp., civil leGal ouTcomes, http://clo.lsc.gov (last visited Apr. 
18, 2017).
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of resistance: it may never happen.84 The United States government — currently 
in a period of flux and transition — might never implement it. Accordingly, the 
question becomes whether we could accomplish both goals (funding nonprofit 
objectors and collecting data on class actions) without public funding. And 
the answer is perhaps — but only on an imperfect, ad hoc basis.
Piecemeal solutions exist for both gathering data and funding nonprofit 
objectors. As for funding, judges might direct cy pres awards to nonprofit 
objectors, such as Public Citizen or the Competitive Enterprise Institute.85 
Although cy pres awards remain controversial,86 allocating funds to nonprofit 
objectors would further the class action’s public enforcement mission and 
could be an appropriate alternative when it is unfeasible to distribute further 
awards to class members.87 Routinely using cy pres funds in this way may 
also curb the abuse of cy pres, for in lieu of the funds going to the parties’ 
(or judge’s) favorite charity, the money would subsidize those who seek to 
hold them accountable.88 
As for data collection, it would be possible for the Subcommittee on 
Rule 23 to revise the rule to require parties to disclose the relevant data to 
the court. Several law professors have set forth a proposal along those lines.89 
Solid data about which notice methods are most effective for different class 
populations and how class members fare under various settlements is vital 
to judges, policymakers, and researchers alike. 
84 Congress has made some overtures toward collecting data in a recent House 
bill. H.R. 985, 115th Cong., Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, 
§ 1719 (2017).
85 E.g., puB. ciTizen, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2581 (last visited Apr. 
18, 2017), (encouraging and accepting cy pres awards).
86 E.g., Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern 
Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 Fla. l. rev. 617 (2010). 
87 The American Law Institute has provided helpful guidance as to when cy pres 
awards are appropriate. principles oF The law oF aGGreGaTe liTiGaTion § 3.07 
(am. law insT. 2010).
88 Martin Redish has argued that cy pres awards are unconstitutional. Redish et 
al., supra note 86, at 641-52. I do not undertake to tackle those concerns here, 
but note that enacting public funding from the general tax base would alleviate 
worries about using cy pres in this way. As I explain, this Band-Aid solution is 
an imperfect stopgap, at best.
89 Letter from Brian Wolfman, Alexandra Lahav, Kevin M. Clermont, Geoffrey 
P. Miller, Brian Fitzpatrick, Nicholas M. Pace, Deborah R. Hensler & Charles 
Silver, to Professor Richard Marcus, Assoc. Reporter to the Advisory Comm. 
on Civil Rules (Mar. 17, 2015) (on file with author).
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But the current stakeholders have incentives to oppose rule changes that 
would mandate data reporting. Plaintiffs’ attorneys have raised the concern that 
making claims data public could scuttle settlements that provide significant 
injunctive (or declaratory) relief or that promote deterrence.90 That seems 
unlikely. Surely data forms could account for the type of relief, as the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau did in its empirical study.91 And given that the 
burden is on the deal’s proponents to justify its fairness, they have ample 
incentive to identify its equitable or deterrent benefits. The real worry is over 
those who invoke a public service mantra to shelter deals that reward them 
handsomely, but that pay class members very little. As such, neither plaintiffs’ 
attorneys nor defendants have any incentive to encourage data collection, for 
they both profit from the status quo. Likewise, most judges are relieved when 
parties present them with a settlement, for it means one less time-consuming 
case on their docket. 
There are points of light, however. Even now, some judges recognize the 
need to review class members’ claims rates before approving the settlements, 
and have requested that information on their own — something that they 
are well within their power to do.92 Ad hoc data collection is better than 
nothing, but it doesn’t present judges with aggregated data on the same scale 
as they might receive if reporting was mandatory and funding existed for an 
information aggregator. 
ConClUSIon
The United States has long relied on private actors to perform public services, 
like enforcing laws through class actions. And while the approach has worked 
relatively well for the past fifty years, it suffers from a crippling weakness: 
judges tasked with monitoring the attorneys, ensuring that the settlement is 
fair, and awarding attorneys’ fees are ill-equipped to do so when the adversarial 
system breaks down. They lack the necessary information and, at times, the 
90 Perry Cooper, More Judges Eying Class Claims Data? If So, Then What?, BloomBerG 
Bna, Feb. 5, 2016, https://www.bna.com/judges-eying-class-n57982067030/. 
91 consumer Fin. proTecTion Bureau, arBiTraTion sTudY 325 (2015) (defining 
“behavioral relief” to “refer to class settlements which contained a commitment 
by the defendant to alter its behavior prospectively”).
92 Cooper, supra note 90 (reporting that Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton requested 
a report from the settlement administrator detailing the claims filed and the 
payouts to class members, then stated: “Where 6.5% of the payout goes to the 
class members, and 80.2% goes to the attorneys purporting to represent those 
class members, the tail is clearly wagging the dog.”).
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necessary incentive. Objectors exist to shake up this paradigm. But the right 
people need the right resources and the right incentives to do so.
The Subcommittee on Rule 23’s leveling down approach does nothing to 
fill the information deficit that judges face even though it may curtail “bad” 
objectors temporarily. Like the actors objectors seek to regulate, they too are 
shape shifters — adaptive and resilient. Leveling up, on the other hand, is 
different, for it seeks to change the underlying incentives. By publicly funding 
nonprofit objectors, creating data reporting requirements, and financing data 
aggregation, leveling up can avoid the kind of regulatory whack-a-mole that 
leveling down invites.
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